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Notes

A Proposal for Removing Road Blocks
from the Information Superhighway By
Using an Integrated International
Approach to Internet Jurisdiction
CatherineP. Heaven*
Imagine you are the driver of the typical American family.
You cruise the Information Superhighway, driving the speed
limit in your minivan, the two kids fighting in the back over
whether the next website visited should be the WNBA 1 or the
NFL2 . Suddenly, a racecar displaying pornographic pictures in
the windows streaks by, traveling at least twice the legal rate of
speed. Ten minutes later, police cars follow as fast as their Ford
Crown Victorias, Toyota Corollas, and Volkswagen Beetles will
carry them. You just shake your head, knowing that the police
cars will probably not catch the racecar. In the rare instances
where the authorities do catch the racecar, the officers will fight
over who has the authority to make the arrest. Their fighting
will cause a slowing of the flow of traffic. Thus, in both
directions of the highway cars will only move at a crawl.
Questions of jurisdiction and state control over the
prosecution of its citizens are increasingly responsible for digital
roadblocks. This Article begins by examining the development of
the Internet. As cyberspace has evolved, issues of jurisdiction
have arisen, as have proposed solutions. Next, this Article
describes and analyzes the solutions proposed by the United
* A special thanks to Mary Rumsey for her tireless effort to find Internet
sources for the European Union research. Heartfelt thanks to Beth DeCourcy for her
support and careful edits, and to Ethan Glass for his uncanny ability to find the
words to better express my thoughts in difficult passages.
1. Women's National Basketball Association Website, at http://www.wnba.com
(last visited Oct. 2, 2000).
2. NationalFootballLeague Website, at http://www.nfl.com (last visited Oct. 2,

2000).
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States and the European Community. Finally, this Article
concludes that, under the Outer Space Treaty, the World Wide
Web (hereinafter "Web") should be deemed an international
space.
I.
A.

THE INTERNET AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

THE BIRTH OF A GLOBAL PHENOMENON

Formally, the term "Internet" is defined as "the global
information system that is logically linked together by a globally
unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its
subsequent extensions/follow-ons." 3 In addition, included in this
definition is a requirement that the Internet support
communications
using
the
Transmission
Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) and provide "high level
services layered on the communications and related
infrastructure." 4 Less technically, the Internet exists,
"everywhere and nowhere.. .in the smallest bursts of matter
and energy.. .called forth only by the presence of man through
the intercession of an Internet provider."5 Cyberspace is a global
network of networks that allows an individual user to exchange
information with any computer in the system. 6 This network of
networks now entertains millions of users7 and provides the
8
medium for the transfer of billions of dollars of commerce.
Despite its current omnipotence, however, the Internet had a
rather humble beginning.
J.C.R. Licklider of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) first articulated the conception of social
interactions through digital networking in August 1962. 9 He
3. Fed. Networking Comm'n, Definition of the Internet (Oct. 24, 1995), at
httpJ/www.fnc.gov/Internet res.html.
4. Id.
5. Darrel C. Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International
Spaces, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 69-70 (1998), available at http://
www.mttlr.org/volfour/menthe.html.
6. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
7. Commerce Net Research Center, World Wide Internet Population,at http://
www.commerce.net/research/stats/wwstats.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
8. See generally L. Margherio, The Emerging Digital Economy at http:/
www.ecommerce.gov/danintro.htm (last visited Oct. 25, (2000)).
9. See BARRY M. LEINER ET AL., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET (authored
by the Director of the Research Institute for Advanced Computer Science, Senior

2001]

INTERNATIONAL INTERNET JURISDICTION

envisioned that computers across the world would be
interconnected so users could quickly access any available data
and programs from any location with a computer. His "Galactic
Network" theory, incredibly, envisioned a system that closely
resembles the Internet we use today. The first major step
toward the Galactic Network occurred in 1965, when Larry
Roberts and Thomas Merrill used the TX-2 computer in
Massachusetts to call the Q-32 in California on a low-speed
telephone line. 10 This creation of the first wide-area network
proved that computers could work together, but it also
demonstrated that the telephone system provided an inadequate
backbone. Fortunately, Leonard Kleinrock of MIT (and others)
remedied the problem by pioneering the use of packets rather
than circuits in transferring information. 1
At about the same time, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) hired Licklider to lead its computer
research program. 12 Licklider in turn hired Roberts to develop
the network concept, which resulted in the ARPANET proposal.
In September 1969, after much research and funding requests,
the first node on the ARPANET was installed at Kleinrock's
Network Measurement Center at UCLA. 13 One month later, the
Stanford Research Institute (SRI) connected to the ARPANET
and the first host-to-host message was sent from UCLA to
Stanford. 14 By the end of 1969, ARPANET had networked four
computers. It took only three more years for the ARPANET to
be developed to a point of wide use and for its first public
demonstration at the International Computer Communication
Conference (ICCC). The Internet was born.
As of January 2000, over 242 million people worldwide
access the Internet, with a growth rate that projects 490 million
users by the end of the year 2002.15 North America leads the
globe in number of users with 120 million, followed by Europe
with 70 million. 16 The dominance of Europe and North America
Vice President of Internet Architecture and Technology at MCI WorldCom, Senior
Research Scientist at the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, President of the
Corporation for National Research Initiatives, Professor of Computer Science at
UCLA, among others), at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.html.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Commerce Net Research Center, supra note 7, at http://www.commerce.net/
research/stats/wwstats.html.
16. Id.
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can be reflected in the percentage of English speakers on the
Internet (47.6%) and speakers of other European languages
(29.2%) on the Net, compared with all other languages (23.2%).17
However, this distribution of languages could change
dramatically in the next few years. In general, any common
Internet search is likely to pull many non-English language
sites. Specifically, Asia and the Pacific Rim are expected to have
a phenomenal growth rate of approximately 422% in the next
five years, with an estimated number of users reaching 228
million by 2005.18
The growth of the Internet has already facilitated the
globalization of financial markets and the rise of electronic
commerce. 19 Individual companies such as Cisco, Dell and
General Electric have collectively generated seventeen billion
dollars in commerce over the past three years. 20 These
companies represent a small proportion of e-commerce; that is, a
1999 survey predicted that e-commerce will generate 1.3 trillion
dollars of revenue by 2003.21 In additional to retail, nearly
ninety percent of users surf the internet to gather news or
22
information.
For all of its potential to provide information and
opportunities for commerce, the Internet also has a dark side.
Businesses cite several problems as potential inhibitors of
future growth, which include a lack of a predictable legal
23
environment, the potential for taxation, and Internet security.
In addition, cybercrime against governments, businesses, and
individuals is becoming more difficult to regulate. 24 A recent FBI
study showed that between 1997 and 1999, Fortune 500
17. Global Reach, Global Internet Statistics (by Language), at http:fl
www.glreach.com/globstats/index/php3 (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
18. Commerce Net Research Center, supra note 7, at http://www.commerce.nett
research/stats/wwstats.html.
19. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The Interaction of
Science and Technology with InternationalLaw, 88 KY. L.J. 809, 837 (1999-2000).
20. See L. Margherio, supra note 8, at http://www.ecommerce.gov/
danintro.htm.
21. ActivMedia Research, Global Ecommerce to Top USD95 Billion in "99 [NUA
Internet Surveys], at //www.nua.ie/surveys/index.cgi? f=VS&artjid=905354987&
rel=true (Jun. 28, 1999).
22. Kate Maddox, Information Still Killer App on the Internet, in ADVER. AGE
(Oct. 6, 1997), available at http://adage.com/interactive/articles/19971006/
article7.html.
23. See L. Margherio, supra note 8, at http://www.ecommerce.gov/danintro.htm.
24. See International Chamber of Commerce Conference on Cybercrime,
Alliance Against Commercial Cybercrime, at http://www.infowar.com/conf/99conf
121799a j.shtml (Dec. 7, 1999).
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companies lost over $360 million due to computer crime. 25 The
Internet was accurately summed up as providing "vast
opportunities for socially beneficial endeavors, but also a
potential way for individuals to commit unlawful acts
anonymously and at low risk, such as unauthorized access to
private communications,.., financial fraud, the distribution of
child pornography and the piracy of creative materials."26
B.

NATION-BASED JURISDICTION AND AN INTERNATIONAL
NETWORK

In the international community, a limit is placed on
jurisdiction requiring States to refrain from actions that
encroach on another State's sovereignty. 27 Jurisdiction has been
primarily based on physical geography; the Internet, as a
network of networks, destroys these classic notions by
transcending geographic constraints. 28 A connection between a
physical location and an Internet address is both unnecessary
and unimportant, in some instances, such a connection is nonexistent as many enterprises solely exist digitally.29 The same
technology that gives global consumers access to a virtual
Nordstrom's shoe department also allows cybercriminals to
commit offenses across international borders that are difficult to
successfully prosecute. 30 Discrepancies in regulations and
concepts of jurisdiction in the international community
challenge law enforcement officials3 1 as they try to appropriately
assert their historical right to control crime within their borders
32
stemming from extraterritorial acts.
25.

Christine Gregoire, Law Enforcement Challenges in Cyberspace, 34

PROSECUTOR 28, 29 (Sept. - Oct. 2000).

26. UNESCO Observatory on the Information Society, G8 Paris Conference:
Paris, 15th-17th May 2000, at http://webworld.unesco.org/webworld/observatory/in
focus/120500.shtml (last visited Sept. 27, 2000).
27.

See L4AN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (5th ed.

1998).
28. See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
29. Tapio Puurunen, The Legislative Jurisdictionof States Over Transactions
in InternationalElectronic Commerce, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 689,
690 (2000) (citing D.R. Johnson & D. Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1371 (1996)).
30. See ENLIST, Computer Crime Commentary, at http://195.40.43.15/
enlist/subjects/is/resources/computercrime.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2000).
31. Id.
32. Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significanceof Territorial
Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 476 (1998).
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Generally, if an activity takes place within a territory, that
territory has the jurisdiction to create laws to regulate the
activity. 33 This form of jurisdiction, by its very definition,
excludes criminal and tortious acts that cross international
borders. If the primary effect of an outside act is felt inside the
34
territory, the injured party can claim objective territoriality.
Objective territoriality is also known as the effects doctrine,
which grounds jurisdiction in the location of the injurious
effect. 35 This form of jurisdiction is not effective in regulating
the Internet, however, because placing information on the
Internet that is broadcast internationally is generally
36
recognized as insufficient for personal jurisdiction.
Without a clear argument for following one of the classic
types of international jurisdiction, territories have turned to
regulating individual parties. International law does not
prohibit concurrent jurisdiction over international criminal and
civil matters, but in fact considers it the norm.37 This unclear
position on potential liability may encourage States to enact
stringent Internet regulations to protect their consumers; 38
furthermore, this also makes it very difficult for a trader to
39
predict how States will respond to legal actions that are filed.
For the wary consumer attempting to legally negotiate the
Internet, caution must be used while both uploading and
downloading information.
Nation-states attempting to control the proliferation of
criminal activity on the Internet through territory-based
regulations face two alternatives, i.e. they can regulate the
uploader or the downloader. If governments choose to regulate
the uploading of information on the Internet, they run into the
problem of limiting freedom of expression by instituting
limitations based on other countries' displeasure with website
33. Menthe, supra note 5, at 71-72.
34. Id. at 72.
35. PETER
MALANCZUX,
AKENHURS's
MODERN
INTRODUCTION
TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-11 (7th ed. 1997).
36. See Eric Schneiderman & Ronald Kornreich, Personal Jurisdiction and
Internet Commerce, N.Y.L.J., June 4, 1997 at A4; Note, World-Wide Volkswagen,
Meet the World Wide Web: An Examination of Personal JurisdictionApplied to a
New World, 71 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 403 (1997).
37. See BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 314.
38. See e.g. Statement of Minnesota Attorney General's Office on Internet
Jurisdiction, Warning to All Internet Users and Providers, at http://www.ag.state.
mn.us/home/consumer/consumernews/OnlineScams/memo.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2000).
39. Puurunen, supra note 29, at 733.
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content. 40 Focusing on the downloader, or information receiver,
also presents significant problems. Governments can penalize
in-state users that participate in illegal transactions or42
download banned content, 41 but evasion will still be possible.
For example, censorship has been the policy choice of
Singapore, 43 but the proliferation of cyberporn and other
objectionable sites makes their attempts at regulation
ineffective." In addition, pressuring Internet sites to modify
their content because of censorship has spillover effects in other
countries by preventing citizens from downloading information
that is legal in their countries. 45 Reducing this spillover effect is
best achieved through inter-state harmonization of Internet
regulations.46
C.

IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION TO THE JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM

1. Approaches to Internet Regulation
Individual nations and groups of nations have been working
to develop solutions to the questions posed by Internet
jurisdiction. The current policy debate in the United States over
who should have jurisdiction over cybercrime 47 exemplifies the
current struggle between nation-states as they decide whether
to create their own laws or join international attempts at
regulation. The European Union is also developing an approach
to Internet jurisdiction. In a number of initiatives, the European
Community has created the beginnings of a global standard, 48 a

40. Menthe, supra note 5, at 82.
41. Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 481.
42. Id. at 482.
43. See Garry Rodan, The Internet and Political Control in Singapore, 113 POL.
Sci. Q. 63, 77-78 (1998).
44. Joseph C. Rodriguez, A ComparativeStudy of Internet Content Regulations

in the United States and Singapore: The Invincibility of Cyberporn, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L.
& POL'YJ. 1, 24 (2000).
45. Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 488-89.
46. Id. at 490.
47. See generally Laura Ann Forbes, A More Convenient Crime: Why States
Must Regulate Internet-Related Criminal Activity Under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 20 PACE L. REV. 189 (1999).
48. See generally Resolution on the Communication from the Commission on
Globalisationand the Information Society: The Need for Strengthened International
Coordination, 1999 O.J. (C 104) 128 [hereinafter International Coordination
Resolution].
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solution that some feel infringes upon individual rights.49
In addition to State action on the issue, prior treaties and
current legal theories point to a global solution to regulating
cyberspace through an international treaty that addresses
illegal actions and censorship. Prior treaties that address Outer
Space 5o and the Law of the Sea 5' set the foundation for the
concept of international space as the "common heritage of
mankind."52 The "common heritage of mankind" (CHM) has
been defined as a principle that extends management rights of
an area to everyone, while giving ownership to no one.5 3 The
the area using treaties and norms
global community regulates
54
of international law.
In addition to the framework established by the concept of
CHM, a principle known as the "universality principle" provides
a model for the type of treaty that could be established
internationally to regulate the Internet. The universality
principle allows any State to punish individuals for committing
offenses of international concern even if the State has no
jurisdictional links to the area the crime took place or the
persons involved. 55 Currently, it has limited application to
international wrongs such as crimes against peace, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. 56 Applying the universality
principle to the Internet and agreeing on a global standard for a
minimum level of consumer protection would give all States the
ability to regulate international transactions. 57 Due to the
varying approaches States have to consumer protection, a
universal standard would be difficult to agree upon and
49. See The Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Global Internet Liberty
CampaignMember Letter on Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-Crime, at http:/l
www.gilc.org/provace/coe-letter-1000.html (Oct. 18, 2000).
50. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Jan. 27, 1967, art. 1, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2412-13, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 207-08 [hereinafter
Outer Space Treaty].
51. See Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 136, 21 I.L.M.
1261, 1293.
52. Menthe, supra note 5, at 86.
53. Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common
Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190, 191 (1986).
54. Id.
55.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1986).

56. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 188 (1946);
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, No. 972, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention
relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, No. 973,
75 U.N.T.S. 287.
57. Puurunen, supra note 29, at 730.
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implement in the current international system.5 8
Although acknowledging that difficulty is a necessary and
important step, it is highly unlikely that individual State action
is capable of developing a logical approach to jurisdiction in
cyberspace. 59 Territorial regulation of the Internet will succeed
only in creating inconsistent regulations and difficult spillover
effects. 60 Therefore, international harmonization or a new set of
be
criteria for determining jurisdiction over claims may 61
necessary to resolve the current Internet regulation dilemma.
2. On One Hand: The U.S Response to Internet Jurisdiction
Debates over who has jurisdiction to hale individuals into
court for criminal charges relating to Internet behavior have
been raging in the United States,62 thus providing a concrete
example of the types of jurisdictional questions that become
more nebulous when they are applied to the International
arena. The spectrum of policy choices for Internet jurisdiction
can be exemplified by engaging in three legal examinations.
First, this Part discusses the theoretical role of states' rights in
the development of criminal sanctions. 63 Second, this Part turns
to the actions of a state that broadly construe the concept of
personal jurisdiction on the Internet.6 Finally, this Part
analyzes the former Attorney General's proposal for prevention
65
of Internet crime and enforcement of current sanctions.
a. Cybercrime Regulated through the Dormant Commerce Clause?
The area of criminal law is a startling example of the
potential for jurisdictional complexity regarding the Internet
because of its ability to pull individuals into jurisdictions
without the minimum contact requirement for criminal
prosecutions that is required in civil litigation.66 The potential
58.

See Matthew S. Yeo & Marco Berliri, Conflict Looms Over Choice ofLaw in

Internet Transactions,4 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 85, 89 (1998).

59.
60.
61.
62.

Puurunen, supra note 29, at 745.
Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 478.
Puurunen, supra note 29, at 745.
See generally Forbes, supra note 47.

63.

Id.

64. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W. 2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997), aff'd, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
65. See generally Janet Reno Attorney General's Cyber Crime Plan, 34
PROSECUTOR 21 (2000).
66. Terrence Berg, State Criminal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Is There a
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for abusing the "long arm"67 of criminal law is so great that even
proponents for individual state regulation of intrastate Internet
crime believe the "purposeful availment"68 and "minimum
contacts" 69 tests should be applied to criminal activities in any
jurisdictional analysis. 70 Setting aside the problem of minimum
contacts, the heart of the argument for retaining state autonomy
in Internet crime regulation revolves around the notion that
criminal law is one of the fundamental and classic domains of
states' rights, 71 a right that should not be intruded on for fear of
the creation of a general federal police power. 72 Proponents of
the states' rights approach argue that the link between their
regulation of Internet crime and interstate commerce is as
attenuated as federal regulation of guns in schools, 73 and that as
technology-based crime continues to increase, states will see a
74
weakening of their constitutionally-given police power.
Using this approach, each state would have jurisdiction
over Internet crime that took place entirely within the state's
borders. 75 While this theory may appear to preserve the classic
notion of state-regulation of criminal activity 76 and
Constitutional distinctions inherent in the U.S. system, it does
not address the issues raised by interstate cybercrime, let alone
international cybercrime. In addition to its limited focus,
allowing the Dormant Commerce Clause to control Internet
regulations leaves individual states with the power to create allencompassing prohibitions that impinge on the sovereignty of
77
other states.
b. A State Attempt from the Land of Ten Thousand Lakes
If individual states are given discretion to create and
enforce criminal statutes regulating Internet behavior, any
Sheriff on the ElectronicFrontier?79 MICH. B.J. 659, 662 (2000).
67. Forbes, supra note 47, at 190-91.
68. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
69. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
70. Forbes, supra note 47, at 190-91.
71. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
72. Id. at 567.
73.

See id.

74. Forbes, supra note 47, at 218.
75. See generally Berg, supra note 66 (desecribing state attemtps to prosecute
cybercrime).
76. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
77. See e.g. Statement of Minnesota Attorney General, supra note 38, at http://
www.ag.state.mn.us/home/consumer/consumernews/OnlineScams/memo.html.
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number of permutations of current penalties are possible; the
most troubling are those states that claim jurisdiction over
persons outside of their borders.7 8 Minnesota represents the
pinnacle of jurisdictional infringement on other states, issuing a
statement on the Internet to all users who come into contact
with Minnesotans.7 9 The statement warns, "Persons outside of
Minnesota who transmit information via the Internet knowing
that information will be disseminated in Minnesota are subject
to jurisdiction in Minnesota courts for violations of state
criminal and civil laws."8 0 The notice then reinforces the
statement with the state's long-arm statute and Minnesota case
law that permitted jurisdiction over cases the Attorney General
equates with cybercrime. 8 '
This sweeping interpretation of Minnesota's jurisdiction
over the Internet has been reinforced in the court system. In
1997, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's
finding of personal jurisdiction over a n out-of -state website
owner based on advertisements he placed on his website that
was accessed by over 200 computers in Minnesota. 2 The Court
considered the website a form of advertisement that indicated
the defendant's intent to serve the area, and the intent to serve
was illegal when applied to the gambling business of the
defendant. 83 Minnesota demonstrates the danger that sweeping
jurisdictional claims can have for persons operating websites
and shows how creating statutes in an unregulated national
system will infringe upon other state's jurisdictional rights.
c. A Federal Solution
Examining the reaction of the federal government to the
increasing problems surrounding jurisdiction and the Internet is
important not only because it shows the difficulty of
superimposing multiple territorial statutes on a homeless
network, but also because the United States has a dominant
global Internet presence8 4 That is, Americans constitute a

78. Menthe, supra note 5.
79. See Statement of Minnesota Attorney General, supra note 38, at http:/l
www.ag.state.mn.us/home/consumer/consumernews/OnlineScams/memo.html.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997), aftd, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
83. Id. at 719.
84. Rodriguez, supra note 44, at 46.
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majority of Internet users,8 5 and the United States will likely
provide most of the content on the global network.8 6
Lawmakers at the federal level have vacillated in the last
few years over the approach they want to take in regulating the
Internet. In July 1997, the United States adopted a "hands off'
policy toward the Internet to promote growth and diversity of
ideas, arguing that users had the capability to shield themselves
from content they deemed offensive.8 7 A year later, Congress
passed bills focused on policing the Internet, specifically in the
areas of child pornography and obscenity.8 8 While the federal
government continues to try to strike a balance between
protecting expression and the marketplace of ideas8 9 and
protecting citizens from illicit materials, 90 there has been a push
to increase the federal government's influence over Web
regulations. 91
The arguments for increased federalization of Internet
regulation are strengthened by cases such as those from
Minnesota. The federal government argues that Internet
communications are articles of interstate commerce, 92 and that
the Internet, labeled the Information Superhighway, is the
virtual equivalent of a paved highway, a classic example of a
federally regulated commercial channel.93 This premise has been
reinforced in the court system, with a holding that inconsistent
state regulations would have a chilling effect on commerce. 94
While the debate on commerce continues to occupy space in
the scholarly journals, former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno
forged ahead in the area of cybercrime. Her Cyber Crime Plan
involved the development of a response network with federal,
state, and local investigators equipped to keep pace with hightech criminals and provide information to other jurisdictions

85. Commerce Net Research Center, supra note 8, at http://www.commerce.net/
research/stats/wwstats.htm..
86. Rodriguez, supra note 44, at 46.
87. See William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce, at http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2001).
88. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
89. Rodriguez, supra note 44 at 3.
90. Id. at 34.
91. See e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844.
92. Forbes, supra note 47, at 218.
93. Id.
94. See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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around the clock. 95 In creating her plan, she focused on fostering
the emerging value placed on locating and prosecuting
cybercriminals while also maintaining classic values such as
freedom of speech, privacy, and growth of the free market. 96 The
former Attorney General's approach to cybercrime regulation
intertwines the federal and state governments 97, exemplifying
the complex position of U.S. policymakers. In turn, the United
States' position on the Internet, with a debate over how
commerce should be regulated on the Internet combined with
the beginning of a comprehensive solution to the problem of
cybercrime, represents a microcosm of the debate taking place
internationally on the growth and regulation of the Internet.
3. On the Other Hand: The European Community's Response to
Regulating the InformationAge
a. The European Union Data Protection Directive
Privacy law has developed concurrent with the growth of
and dependence upon the electronic transmission of data.9 8
Created as a response to the increase in cross-border transfer of
information within the European Union,99 the European Union
Data Protection Directive (EUDPD) was adopted in 1995 and
took effect in 1998.100 Although the EUDPD was drafted in the
early 1990s, before the Internet was viewed as a data collection
tool,' 0 ' the EUDPD applies generally to the processing of any
personal data collected, 10 2 including websites that collect
personal information. The protection principles of the EUDPD
apply to the transfer of all data to countries or territories out of
95. Reno, supra note 65, at 25.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See John Mullen, E.U. Data Protection and the U.S. Safe Harbors 1 (Oct.
26, 2000) (unpublished conference materials, on file at Fredrikson & Byron, P.A.).
99. Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processingof
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, Council Directive 95/46,
1995 O.J. (L281) 31, available at, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/data/1995/en_
395L0046.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2000), [hereinafter Council Directive 95/46/EC].

100.

Id. at 49.

101. Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice and Privacy: InternationalChoice of
Law and the Internet, 32 INT'L. LAW. 991, 1008 (1998).
102. Id. See generally Kevin Bloss, Note, Raising or Razing the E-Curtain?:the
EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 645

(2000).
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the European Economic Areas. 0 3
In order to achieve a safe harbor from the regulations as a non-EU
entity, the organization must satisfy seven principles: 1) provide notice
to the individual of: a) of the purposes for collection, b) how to contact
the organization, c) what other parties will receive the information,
and d) choices for limiting disclosure; 2) have either opt-out or opt-in
provisions available for all data collection, with opt-in as the mandate
for sensitive information; 3) apply all notice principles to the use of
information by 3rd parties; 4) maintain access and ability to correct
information; 5) take reasonable precautions to secure the information
against lost or misuse; 6) take reasonable steps to ensure the
information is accurate and current; and 7) provide 1mechanisms
for
04
the investigation and resolution of individual's claims.

Enactment of the EUDPD does not actually take place
through the European Union, but is effectuated by having all
member countries pass laws in their home states and making
10 5
those subject to their jurisdiction operate under the State law.
The laws will differ from one another in both large and small
ways, with potential problem areas surrounding sensitive data
and data transfer outside of the European Union. 0 6 Individual
states are allowed to modify the proposal when enacting the
legislation in their governments for: 1) national security; 2)
defense; 3) public security; 4) crime enforcement; 5) an
important economic interest of a Member State; 6) monitoring or
inspection in cases of official authority; and 7) the protection of
07
data subject to the right of freedom to others.
Problems arise when examining choice of law and
jurisdiction issues. First, there is a question of which country's
law applies when an institution is headquartered in one country
and operates businesses in another. 0 8 That difficulty is only
compounded when an entity is located in multiple EU countries,
a situation where most likely the strictest privacy protocol will
apply in all countries where the entity is located. 0 9 The
complexity increases further when the entity offending the
privacy laws is located outside of a EUDPD country. Finally,
there is a possibility that U.S. websites that collect information
from citizens of EU countries are subject to the EU courts for
103. Mullen, supra note 98.
104. Id.
105. See generally http://www.privacyexchange.org (containing information on
data protection laws and decisions of agencies on the subject matter).
106. Swire, supra note 101, at 1002.
107.
108.

See Council Directive 95/461EC, supra note 99.
Swire, supra note 101, at 1007.

109.

Id.
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violations of their privacy directives. 110 The EUDPD, while it
has taken great strides toward instituting measures to protect
information about individuals, will still face many difficult
choice of law and jurisdictional questions as long as States enact
their own, discrepant laws.
b. European Committee on Crime Problems Committee of Experts
on Crime in Cyber-Space
The Council of Europe made progress in the field of
international cybercrime regulation when it released the first
draft of an international convention in April 2000.111 In a
resolution predating the proposal, the European Parliament
asserted its desire to create a legislative approach that is both
12
timely and flexible to accommodate developing technology,
and allow for open access to the Internet without U.S.
3
jurisdiction over the Internet as a whole."
The Crime in Cyberspace 1 4 draft that followed is a
significant step toward the first international treaty to regulate
computer systems and criminal offenses. 1 5 Once completed, it
will require future Parties to provide each other with assistance
in the collection of evidence, location of offenders, and
extradition, as well as establish national contact points
continuously available for handling such requests. 1 6 The treaty
will also include a section on content-related offenses, including
7
child pornography and copyright law."
Jurisdiction will be founded on whether the offense is
committed in the territory or by a national, and disputes are to
be settled through consultation.18 Extradition will be handled
by including cybercrime as an extraditable offense under
existing treaties." 9 It is important to note that the current draft
110.

Id. at 1008.

111. See generally Council of Europe, Draft Convention on Cyber-crime, No. 19,
available at http://cybercrimes.net/CouncilEurope/maindraft.html (last visited Mar.
14, 2001).
112. International Coordination Resolution, supra note 48.
113. See generally Draft Convention on Cyber-Crime No. 19, http://cybercrimes.
net/CouncilEurope/maindraft.html, supra note 111.
114. See generally id.
115. Resolution on the Communication from the Commission on Globalisation
and the Information Society: The Need for Strengthened International Coordination,
1999, O.J. (C 104) 128.
116. Draft Convention on Cyber-crime No. 19, supra note 111.
117. See id. at 4-5.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id. at9.
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of the treaty requires participating Parties to pass their own
legislative measures concerning these topics, desiring but not
requiring that the criminal statutes passed are uniform. 120 The
treaty aims to be legally binding, finalized by December 2000,
and open for signature autumn 2001.121
On October 2, 2000, the Council of Europe released a second
draft of its proposal for a comprehensive solution to the problem
of international cybercrime. 122 The proposal has a sweeping
scope, purporting to include "any public or private entity that
provides to users of its service the ability to communicate by
means of a computer system, and any other entity that
processes or stores computer data on behalf of such
communication service or users of such service."' 23 The Draft on
Cyber-Crime (Draft) requests that each participating Party pass
legislative and other measures that establish criminal and other
penalties for offenses relating to: 1) illegal access and
interception of data; 2) data interference; 3) system interference;
4) the production, sale, import, and distribution of illegal
devices; 5) computer-related forgery; 6) computer-related fraud;
7) child pornography; 8) copyright infringement; 9) accomplice
liability; and 10) corporate liability. 24 In order to enforce the
proposed criminal statutes, procedural methods for cooperation
are detailed in the proposal, 125 including a designated point of
contact available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, to
ensure immediate assistance in the investigation of computer26
related offenses.
The Council has invited all member States, as well as nonmember states that have participated in the process, to ratify
the Draft, either with or without reservations. 127 Once the Draft
is ratified, the Parties may establish jurisdiction over offenses
committed: 1) in its territory; 2) on-board a ship flying the flag
of the Party; 3) on-board an aircraft registered with the Party; 4)
on board a satellite; or 5) by one of its nationals, if: a) the offense
has criminal penalties in the home State; or b) the offense is
120. Id. at 6.
121. Id. at 1.
122. Council of Europe, Draft Convention on Cyber-crime No. 22, Rev. 2,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/projects/cybercrime22.htm
(last
visited Mar. 14, 2001).
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id. at 3-6.
125. Id. at 7-16.
126. Id. at 16.
127. Id. at 17.
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committed outside the State's territorial jurisdiction. 128 Each
Party has the power to sign the Draft with reservations in
regard to jurisdiction, and in cases of overlapping jurisdiction,
the Parties will consult to determine where the trial will be
1
located. 29

The Draft has met with strong criticism from groups in the
international community such as the ACLU, Canadian
journalists for Free Expression, Digital Freedom Network, and
many others. 30 In a letter addressed to the Council of Europe,
these groups raise numerous concerns about the breadth and
scope of the regulations.' 31 For example, Internet Service
Providers raised an objection to the provisions that require the
retaining of records of the activities of consumers; provisions
(Articles 17, 18, 24, 25) that the organizations believe contradict
the basic principles of the Data Protection Directive. 32 These
groups believe that the Draft gives law enforcement agencies
the power to seize information from individuals and
organizations without the appropriate due process limitations
33
and investigative procedures necessary to safeguard rights.
Others have pointed out the expansion of the extradition
portions of the Draft and the requirement that those indicted
process their own data to withdraw the "relevant" portions as
encroach on the rights of the accused. 3 4 In addition, the Draft is
no longer limited to the Council of Europe and drafting
countries, but will be opened to all countries once it becomes
effective. 135 This sweeping jurisdiction without participation in
the process, along with an overly aggressive stance on
prosecution for cyber-crime, calls into question the validity of a
region-based solution to a global phenomenon.

128. Id. at 10.
129. Id.
130. See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Global Internet Liberty Campaign
Member Letter on Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-Crime, 4-7, at http://www.
gilc.org/privacy/coe-letter-1000.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2001).
131. See generally id.
132. Id. at 1.
133. Id. at 2.
134. David
Banisar,
Commentary; Cybercrime Treaty: Take
Two,
SEcuarryFocus NEWS, Oct. 8, 2000, at 1, at http://www.securityfocus.com/
commentary/98 (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
135. Id. at 2.

MINN

J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 10:2

II. HOW HAS GLOBAL SPACE BEEN REGULATED?
A.

INTERNATIONAL SPACE THEORY

The concept of regulating technology that is rapidly
changing global communication through international law is in
a sense ironic because many scholars consider international law
primitive. 136 International law has not been dominant in the
field of science and technology, with participating countries only
drafting a few treaties on the subject. 137 However, through
treaties regulating the sea and outer space, a theory of
"international spaces" has developed. 138 According to the theory
of international spaces, nationality, not territory, is the basis for
jurisdiction. 139 Thus, the person who created or controls the
website or links to websites attaches his or her nationality to
the site and creates virtual islands, 40 much like how flags
created an island of jurisdiction for ships at the beginning of the
development of the Law of the Sea.' 4 ' The nationality of
individuals surfing the Web can be viewed as an anchor of
jurisdiction in cyberspace, a nonphysical,142 non-territorial
virtual community. 43 The Web itself has the potential to be
classified using more global terminology.
B.

THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND

Global commons are areas outside of the jurisdiction of
nations, whether singularly or in associations.14 The theory
behind global commons and Common Heritage Mankind (CHM)
is res communes: all nations should benefit from the resources
that are recovered from areas in which all nations have an
interest. 45 According to CHM principles, no one nation owns

136. Dellapenna, supra note 19, at 859.
137. Id. at 831.
138. Menthe, supra note 5, at 70.
139. Id. at 83.
140. Id. at 93.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 85.
143. Id. at 96.
144. Phillip E. Wilson, Jr., Barking Up the Right Tree: Proposalsfor Enhancing
the Effectiveness of the InternationalTropical Timber Agreement, 10 TEMP. INT'L &
CoMP. L.J. 229, 232 (1996).
145. Joan Eltman, A Peace Zone on the High Seas: Managing the Commons for
Equitable Use, 5 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 47, 64 (1993).
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areas that have the CHM distinction. 146 Instead, the
international community, through treaties, norms, and
agreements, collectively regulate the area for the benefit of all
parties. 147 Under CHM, "mankind" takes on a set of priorities
distinct from the summation of individual nation-state
interests. 48 Examples of global commons, or CHM spaces,
15
include outer space, 49 Antarctica, 50 and the high seas. ' Most
authorities agree that there are five elements of CHM: 1) the
CHM cannot be appropriated; 2) all states manage the resources
in the CHM; 3) benefits from exploitation of the resources in the
CHM area are shared; 4) the CHM area is used for peaceful
purposes only;
and 5) the CHM should be preserved for future
152
generations.
Developing nations favor a broad CHM application, arguing
that it is crucial to a reformulation of the existing geopolitical
order. 53 For that same reason, developed states believe that
CHM should not diminish or alter in a nation's freedom to
54
explore and exploit both the sea and outer space in any way.
This inherent difference in interpretation is analogous to the
"tragedy of the commons," 55 a theory which states that any
communal resources will be subject to overuse by those able to
exploit them. 56 In this communal situation, the argument is
that wealthy and powerful members of the collective will push
through rules that favor them, often at the expense of the
146.

Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common

Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190, 191 (1986).
147. Id.
148. Harminderpal Singh Rana, The "Common Heritage of Mankind" & The
Final Frontier:A Revaluationof Values Constitutingthe InternationalLegal Regime
for Outer Space Activities, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 225, 229 (1994).
149. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50.
150. See generally Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, art. VIII § 1, 12 U.S.T. 794,
402 U.N.T.S. 71.
151. See generally Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 51, at 1293.
152. Barbara Ellen Heim, Note, Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral
Resources: A Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer
Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819, 827 (1990).
153. Gennady M. Danilenko, The Concept of the "Common Heritageof Mankind"
in InternationalLaw, 13 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 247, 249 (1988).
154. Grier C. Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a Regime to Govern
Resource Exploitationin Outer Space, 7 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 727, 738 (1986).
155. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968) (arguing that the population problem, among others, has no technical
solution because participants perceive marginal individual rewards of exploiting the
commons, while the costs are less salient to the participants because they are
distributed among the group of participants).
156. See id. at 1244-45.
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group. 15 This effect can be lessened by relatively equal access
among all users of the particular resource. 158 Even with these
potential problems, the CHM principle has been applied to outer
space treaties.
C.

OUTER SPACE TREATIES

The United Nation's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COUPOS) drafted the first Outer Space Treaty in
1967.159 This treaty has formed the basis for other agreements
concerning the exploration of space. 160 The treaty makes explicit
its overarching goal to leave outer space a free zone for
exploration and use by everyone without discrimination and
according to international law. 161 Viewing the Outer Space
treaty as a whole, a few basic principles appear: 1) Activities
must be conducted in the interest and benefit of all countries,
and
on
appropriation
prohibition
with
a
general
in
militarization; 1 62 2) States are responsible for, and should be 163
authority;
their
under
launched
objects
of,
control
reasonable
and 3) international mutual assistance and cooperation are
obligatory in outer space activities. 16
The Moon Treaty, an outgrowth from the first Outer Space
165
Treaty, is the first theory to give force to the CHM principle.
Article 11 of the Moon Treaty states that, "the moon and its
natural resources are the common heritage of mankind.. .not to
be subject to national appropriation." 166 In addition, the treaty
mandates that the surface and subsurface of the moon cannot
become the property of any party. 16 7 This sweeping language
classifies the moon as the collective possession of the people of
Earth.168
157.

See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.

REV. 1697, 1741-42 (1996).
158. See id.

159. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50.
160. See Joseph A. Bosco, International Law Regarding Outer Space-An
Overview, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 609, 614 (1990).
161.
162.
163.
164.

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at 2410.
Rana, supra note 148, at 245.
Id.
Id.

165. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, arts. 1(1), 3, 4, 6, 11, 14, 1363
U.N.T.S. 22, 22-26 [hereinafter Moon Treaty] (declaring moon to be CHM).
166. Id. at 25.
167. Id.
168. Heidi Keefe, Essay, Making the FinalFrontierFeasible:A CriticalLook at
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This evolution of international treaties toward CHM has
not been met without criticism. The Moon Treaty itself has been
subject to the criticisms that it is "insufficient in scope,
ineffective for control, and unavailing for implementation and
enforcement for the purposes of regulation."1 69 To reinforce the
argument that it is insufficient in scope, some literalists have
read the treaty's text and concluded that since its sweeping
language does not include individual exploitation of the moon's
resources, it effectively prohibits governments from taking
possession of celestial resources, but allows private individuals
free reign. 170 A final structural criticism of the Moon Treaty is
that it does not establish an international regime to enforce its
17 1
directives, but instead requests that the States-Parties do so.
On a theoretical level, additional criticisms have been
leveled against the CHM provisions of the Moon Treaty. One
such criticism is that a lack of sovereignty or ownership by
Parties over territory in outer space prevents the formation of a
stable environment that would allow individuals with the
resources to explore the area. 17 2 Perhaps more importantly, if
Parties decide to risk exploration in an area of universal
ownership, there is ample opportunity for exploitation that
other Parties might ignore in the name of international
cooperation. 73 Thus, the CHM principle, while attractive and
arguably necessary for newly defined international spaces,
requires a stable structure and detailed statutes to balance its
highly conceptual vision of what a global community can aspire
and grow to be.

the Current Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 345, 366-67 (1995).
169. Harry H. Almond, Jr., New Law for Outer Space: The Adoption ofStandard
Terms and Conditions by Treaty, in PRoc. THIRTY-FOURTH COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER
SPACE 3 (1991).
170. Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article H of the Outer Space Treaty, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 351-52 (1969).
171. See Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, Space Law and the United Nations, 17
ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 137, 147 (1992).

172. See Charles Chukwuma Okolie, InternationalLaw Principleof Jurisdiction
in Regard to Settlements of Humankind on the Moon and Mars, in PROC. THIRTYFOURTH COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 64-65 (1991).
173. Keefe, supra note 168, at 361.
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III. REGULATING THE INTERNET LIKE OTHER
GLOBAL SPACES
The Internet has become a global force, generating billions
of dollars in revenue and accommodating millions of users
worldwide. 174 As a network of networks, the connections
established between parties are fleeting and ever-shifting,
transferring from country to country in a matter of seconds. 175
Finding an anchor for jurisdiction can be difficult in this virtual
community that requires no territory. 76 For that reason, it is a
logical extension of the theory of international spaces to put the
Internet in a category with other areas that cannot be acquired
77
through territorial claims.
A. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE
THE INTERNET

Minnesota's approach to Internet regulation represents
what every jurisdiction should strive not to do.178 The notice that
the Office of the Attorney General of Minnesota displays on the
Internet attempts to subject the producer of any web page
179
accessed by Minnesotans to jurisdiction in the state.
8
0
Concurrent jurisdiction is allowed on criminal matters, so this
declaration has the potential to hale in defendants from
countries around the globe. A policy this stringent is not likely
to prevent the owners of current gambling sites from operating
websites,' 8 ' but it is dangerous when taken to a general level.
That is, if every state in the United States, let alone every
nation in the world, decided to create similar policies, every
claim brought for Internet-related crimes or torts would have
the potential to be decided in any number of states. Creating a
system with choice of law questions that eclipse the attempts at
regulation will not succeed in bringing international order to the
Internet.
174. See supra notes 3-5, 15-22 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 9-18.
176. See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part II.
178. See supra notes 38, 66, and 76 and accompanying text.
179. See Statement of Minnesota Attorney General, supra note 38, at http://
www.ag.state.mn.us/home/consumer/consumernews/OnlineScams/memo.html.
180. BROWNLIE, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also State v. Granite Gate
Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W. 2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 576 N.W.2d 747
(Minn. 1998).
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Individual states in the United States jealously guard their
ability to regulate criminal law, education, and other areas of
civic importance that have traditionally fallen within the states
domain.18 2 Therefore, the nationalization of Internet regulation,
especially in the area of cybercrime, does not register well with
some.18 3 Unfortunately, the argument that "local" Internet crime
exists is unrealistic. E-commerce fits a classic definition of
interstate commerce.'8
Extending this definition to the international community, it
makes no more sense to create individual state regulations in
the United States than it does to create individual nation-state
laws that overlap and contradict in their application to the
Internet. Individuals "surfing" the web in Alabama are just as
likely to be on a New York website as they are a London one,
and will most likely travel the globe at the speed of their
modem. By creating different laws from nation to nation for
downloaders and uploaders, 8 5 especially as applied to criminal
sanctions, the international community is building roadblocks
along the Information Superhighway.
In determining its policy approach for regulating the Web,
the United States government vacillates between increasing
protection of its citizens from the dangers of fraud and
cyberporn and protecting classic rights to privacy and freedom
of expression. 8 6 The burden of creating these regulations and
balancing individual interests is being shifted increasingly to
the federal government, this shift serves as an acknowledgment
that individual state regulations can make the Web a
complicated array of penalties that have a chilling effect on
commerce. 87 The benefits of the U.S. Attorney General's plan to
fight cybercrime, primarily a unified network that will provide
assistance to all jurisdictions and set a universal standard for
what constitutes a cybercrime, demonstrate on a national level
that the global community can reap from creating a uniform
policy for Internet regulation. 8 8

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
See supra notes 47, 66.
See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text
See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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A STEP TOWARD GLOBAL HARMONIZATION

The European Union created a highly detailed response to
the problem of unauthorized information transfer when it
enacted the EUDPD.18 9 The safeguards that are established to
control the flow of data from state to state in the European
Union would be stringent enough to ensure that privacy is
protected for sensitive data transferred on the Web, 190 even
though the EUDPD was drafted before the Internet was the
monolith that it is today.' 9' These progressive protections of
personal information are minimized, however, by the decision of
the European Union not to create a seamless network for all
192
countries to join.
The EUDPD was drafted to give individual countries the
power to modify the data privacy principles in order to pass the
directive through the various European legislatures. 93 While
this policy has increased the ease in which the EUDPD was
ratified, it has also led to problems with choice of law and
jurisdiction. 9 4 Now, international companies have to balance all
of the modifications of the EUDPD in various Member countries,
creating difficulties similarly present when each state has
different data protection laws. 195 This privacy law is a
conceptual leap forward that recognizes the importance of
maintaining privacy in an increasingly information-dominant
society. Nevertheless, the EUDPD's failure to require a uniform
standard for all participating countries has provided an
unfortunate complication to an otherwise progressive policy.
The Crime in Cyberspace Draft (Draft) purports to cover
any entity that communicates through a computer system,
making it a far-reaching proposal that extends into the homes
and offices of millions in the European Union and beyond. 96
Compared to the EUDPD, the Draft features a more detailed
description of how jurisdiction is established, but like the
EUDPD, the Draft requires each country to pass similar
legislation. 97 In an attempt to increase cooperation, the Draft

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See supra I.C.2.a.
Swire, supra note 101.
Id.
See supra note 105.
Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 99, at 31-30.
Swire, supra note 101, at 1007-08.
Id.
Draft Convention on Cyber-crime No. 22, Rev. 2, supra note 122, at 4.
Id. at 10
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has additional provisions that require future Parties to collect
evidence for other Parties, create national contact points, and
assist in the extradition of accused individuals within their
territories. 198
The strength of these measures has created international
concern by various rights activist groups. 199 They feel that the
extradition measures and the ability for law enforcement to
investigate data files violate due process rights as well as the
EUDPD. 20 0 Essentially the opponents argue is that in trying to
protect citizens from the dangers of cyberspace, the Draft
committee has created legislation that strips individuals of
traditional protections against unjust prosecution. 20 ' Somewhere
between the fragmented protection of the EUDPD and the
aggressive international prosecution of the Draft, there should
be a medium for a comprehensive, global approach to Internet
jurisdiction.
C.

THE NECESSITY OF A GLOBAL SOLUTION

Traditional notions of jurisdiction based on territory in the
international system are and will continue to be ineffective to
regulate the growing World Wide Web. 20 2 Even application of
personal jurisdiction, through the effects an action has in a
different territory, is insufficient to base personal jurisdiction on
the growing numbers of Internet claims. 20 3 A lack of a coherent
international system has forced countries to enact inconsistent
regulatory schemes that focus on different parties in Internet
transactions, 20 4 thus creating a potentially hazardous business
environment 20250 6and spillover effects that aversely affect freedom
of expression.
20 7
The Internet fits into the concept of a global commons
198. See Draft Convention on Cyber-crime,No. 19, supra note 111.
199. See Global Internet Library Campaign, supra note 130, at 4-7.
200. Id. at 1-2.
201. Id.
202. See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
203. See Schneiderman & Kornreich, supra note 36, at 1; see also id., supra note
36 and accompanying text.
204. See Brownlie, supra note 27 at 314.
205. See Gregoire, supra note 25, at 29; see also Gregoire, supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
206. See Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 488-89, see also Goldsmith, supra note 32
and accompanying text.
207. See Menthe, supra note 5, at 83.
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more naturally than any attempt to superimpose territoriality
on the nebulous network. 2 8 The principle that CHM areas
belong to no one but are regulated by everyone through global
treaties and norms 20 9 is the only way to contain a network that
has not been successfully regulated using traditional notions of
jurisdiction. 210 While acknowledging that creating universal
norms 211 and regulations for Internet usage will be difficult, 2 2 a
future of inconsistent national policies and spillover effects
limiting free expression 213 will not maximize the potential the
Web has as a communication device and economic tool.
The five elements of CHM 21 4 are actually more easily
applied to the Internet than any physical territory because the
majority of the arguments against the CHM principle focus on
the limited nature of resources and the ability of the powerful to
exploit them through the use of their current economic
leverage. 215 Although there is an inherent requirement for a
computer with the capability to attach itself to the Web, overall
usage does not depend on the ability to be able to extract
natural resources. Rather than being an exploitable resource
with limited capacity, the Internet's ability to grow is limited
only by the power of technological advances.
The basic principles of the Outer Space Treaty, 21 6 precursor
to the Moon Treaty, provide an excellent theoretical foundation
for current Internet regulations. First, activities should be
conducted in a manner that benefits all countries without
attempts at militarization. 21 7 This principle sets the appropriate
tone for creating restrictions on use and protecting consumers
from fraudulent and criminal harms without attempts to gain
political or military advantages over another country.
Second, the Outer Space Treaty makes nations responsible
for the reasonable control over objects launched under their
authority. 218 Adopting a principle similar to this, each individual
nation would take responsibility for the misbehavior of their
208.
209.
210.
211.
254.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See
See
See
See

Puurunen, supra note 29, at 745.
Joyner, supra note 146 at 191.
discussion infra Part I.B.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 55, at

See Yeo & Berliri, supra note 58, at 89.
Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 488-89.
Heim, supranote 152, at 827.
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citizens on the Web while enforcing the universal provisions
created as norms of international law. If a universal set of
regulations could be created in this manner, all Web
participants could be made aware of the restrictions on the
Internet and also face penalties for their actions in their home
territory.
The third general principle set forth in the Outer Space
Treaty makes international mutual assistance and cooperation
obligatory. 219 Mutual assistance is also required in the
Cybercrime Draft, 220 so the concept should not be surprising to
international diplomats. The Draft also demonstrates that any
policy instituted to assist with international investigations
should include clear due process limitations to preserve
the
221
rights of individuals accused of international cybercrimes.
The moon, as the collective possession of the people of
Earth, 222 represents the first application of the CHM theory to
an international treaty.223 Although the treaty is written for the
collective good, individuals are not explicitly mentioned in the
treaty, leading some to argue that while governments are
prevented from exploiting the moon as a resource, individual
investors are not.224 This concern about the omission of
individuals in the Moon Treaty is compounded in the case of
Internet regulation because while few individual investors
currently have the resources to send mining equipment to the
moon, millions of individuals have the capability to log on and
exploit the Internet, often in a location as convenient as their
homes. To eliminate the risk of such strict literalist
interpretations, any treaty drafted must be careful to include
individuals, organizations, and governments in its regulations.
A significant additional criticism of the Moon Treaty is that
a lack of ownership prevents the formation of a stable
environment for investors to explore and develop resources. 225
The size of e-commerce and its potential for growth make this a
very salient argument for potential Internet regulation. 226 Any
regulations of the Internet should be enacted universally for the
purpose of creating a sense of stability that will allow investors
219.
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224.
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to comfortably expand their markets and rest assured that any
wrongs committed against them will be remedied regardless of
the location of the offender.
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL
No object can effectively contain an item larger than itself.
Just as a pint glass will not hold a gallon of water, individual
territory-based regulations cannot effectively control an
international, fluid network of computers. If nations want to
protect their citizens from cyber-based harm, they must link
with the rest of the global community, creating an international
structure large enough to contain the Web. I propose the
creation of an international committee with the sole purpose of
implementing universal standards created by treaty and ratified
by participating Parties designed to bring order to and create
jurisdictional rules for the Internet.
The treaty should begin by declaring the Internet a new
global space, defined by the theory of CHM. Arguably, there is
nothing more entitled to a claim for collective ownership than a
network that has been built by individuals across the globe.
Once the Internet as CHM has been established,
representatives from all regions should participate in the
process of drafting regulations for civil and criminal Internet
actions, as well as the laws covering jurisdiction for legal action
between parties domiciled in different nations.
The regulations that are created should be reviewed and
ratified by all participating Parties. As a prerequisite for
ratification, the Parties must agree to insert the regulations
directly into their legal code, without room for reservations or
modifications of the policies. If Parties are allowed to modify the
regulations that are agreed upon, the problems seen in the Data
Privacy Act will only be compounded, depriving Internet users
of clear notice when they have stumbled into an illegal action.
The requirement that Parties adopt the provisions virtually
verbatim in order to participate in the treaty will be met with
reservations throughout the international community. For that
reason, it would be very difficult to create a first draft of a treaty
that incorporated sensitive areas of the law where countries are
in sharp disagreement. Instead, the committee creating the
regulations should focus on problems that currently approach
universal harms, such as child pornography, and then
subsequently build the regulations from there. This incremental
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approach, while slow and tedious, will allow for a gradual
adjustment to direct implementation of the provisions of treaties
and will also serve to introduce Parties to the novelty of
international Internet regulation at a pace that most will be
able to handle.
Questions of jurisdiction will need to be addressed often by
the committee and the Parties. Once uniform, universal
regulations are enacted to battle cybercrime, the jurisdiction for
hearing the claim will be the jurisdiction of the individual or
entity charged with violating the law. Therefore, a person who
ships illegal pornography to Singapore from the United States
will be prosecuted in the United States under U.S. law. The
debate over civil jurisdiction is still a looming one, one that
should be addressed after the criminal sanctions and
jurisdiction provisions are in place.
The committee should have representatives from each
region of the globe, as well as representatives from the countries
with the highest concentration of Internet activity, with the
actual number to be determined by the United Nations. The
representatives will be responsible for creating the initial drafts
of regulations that will be sent to Parties participating in the
Internet treaty. Those regulations will be modified through an
interactive process with the Parties, leading to the ratification of
amendments to the original treaty establishing an international
commitment to uniform Internet regulation.
In addition to creating draft regulations, the Committee will
be in charge of collecting and distributing data on Internet
usage, commerce, and crime. The reports will be used to further
modify Internet regulations and alert the global community to
potential problems with the existing provisions. Finally, the
Committee will be the coordinating body for international
efforts to increase access to technology in countries that
currently have disproportionately low Internet usage. By
increasing access to the Internet internationally, the Committee
will be fulfilling the principles of universal access that are the
foundation for the 'common heritage of mankind' philosophy
used to create this regulatory body.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet has had a tremendous impact on the
development of a global society, generating billions of dollars in
communication, and
commerce, allowing instantaneous
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providing a new medium for information transfer. Along with
this incredible surge in economic and political growth has come
increased responsibility for the dark side of the technology:
cybercrime, copyright infringement, and a potentially unstable
business environment. The only way to successfully regulate
this new technology is to create a system that is as global and
integrated as the Web, using as its foundation the CHM
principles that advocate the global, open society that the
Internet has propagated.
Creating a regulatory body focused on implementing laws
for the globe rather than individual nation-states is a daunting
task. As the Outer Space and Moon Treaties illustrate, coaxing
sovereign nations into giving up potential territorial rights to
future resources is extremely difficult, and has thus far been
effectuated primarily in cases of resources too difficult to obtain
to be considered lucrative. The Internet, as a huge market that
impacts a range of consumers from powerful corporations to
individual home-users, mostly likely presents itself to nations as
a cyber gold rush with endless possibility. Creating the inertia
for a large group of countries to view international Internet
regulation as a necessity is a daunting task and one that
governments may therefore be unwilling to undertake until
international Internet crime and torts are viewed as a global
crisis.
Current difficulties aside, the future may contain an
integrated approach to Internet jurisdiction as the number of
users grows and the geographic areas with readily available
Internet access increases. The growth of the Internet will
demonstrate that traditional notions of jurisdiction will become
increasingly ineffective in regulating its development. As long as
nations hold on to antiquated views of territorial sovereignty as
supreme for jurisdiction over legal matters, the Internet will
continue to be a complicated array of inconsistent regulations
and criminal safe havens.

